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Emissions trading schemes (ETS) have been operational to control greenhouse gas emissions in 
European Union since 2005. Under the EU ETS, the governments of the Member States agree on 
national emission caps, allocate allowances to industrial operators, track and validate the actual 
emissions and retire allowances at the end of each year. ETS have been proposed to be introduced 
in New Zealand, Australia, Japan, US, Canada, Korea, India and two Chinese provinces in the near 
future. The main idea of the ETS is to create the market for pollution which will provide economic 
agents with incentives to reduce their emissions ( Stavins, et al., 2003). The design of ETS plays an 
important role in reducing greenhouse gas emissions and promoting environmental and economic 
sustainability. There are several designs of ETS including cap-and-trade, baseline-and-credit and 
hybrid, however, cap-and-trade scheme is the most popular among the proposed ETS. The purpose 
of this paper is to perform a comprehensive review of the existing and the proposed ETS focusing 
on design issues. Findings of this research will be useful for countries with existing and proposed 
ETS and for countries intending to adopt ETS in the future. 
 
Keywords: Emission Trading Scheme (ETS), Sustainability, Cap-and-trade, Baseline-and-credit, 
Hybrid  
JEL: Q54, Q58 
                                                 
* Department of Economics Monash University 
† Department of Economics Monash University 
 
© 2011 Svetlana Maslyuk and Dinusha Dharmaratna 
All rights reserved. No part of this paper may be reproduced in any form, or stored in a retrieval system, without the prior written 
permission of the author.   
 2 
 
1.  Introduction  
Our  climate  is  changing,  largely  due  to  the  observed  increases  in  human  produced 
greenhouse gases (Stern, 2007). Greenhouse gases (hereafter GHG) absorb heat from the 
sun in the atmosphere and reduce the amount of heat escaping into space. This extra heat 
has been found to be the primary cause of observed changes in the climate system over the 
20th century. These changes include increases in global average air and ocean temperature, 
widespread melting of snow and ice and rising global sea levels (Stern, 2007). The extra heat 
in  the  climate  system  has  other  impacts,  such  as  affecting  atmospheric  and  ocean 
circulation, which influences rainfall and wind patterns. 
 
Water vapor is the most abundant GHG. Its concentration is highly variable and human 
activities  have  little  direct  impact  on  its  amount  in  the  atmosphere.  The  main  GHG 
generated by human activity are carbon dioxide (CO2), methane and nitrous oxide. There 
are also manufactured gases such as chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and halocarbons. Under 
the 1997 UNFCCC Kyoto Protocol (KP) during the period 2008-2012 38 Annex I nations and 
the members of the EU accept the commitment to reduce six GHG including CO2, CH4, N2O, 
PFC, HFC, SF6 to 5.2% below the emissions level  of 1990 (Huang, et al., 2008).
i  
 
Under the Article 4.5 of the Protoc ol, high income Annex II nations are responsible for 
“helping, promoting and financially assisting affected countries in dealing with the impacts 
of climate change” (Huang, et al., 2008). In order to achieve targeted reduction in the GHG 
emissions,  the  KP  has  established  three  market  based-mechanisms,  emissions  trading 
(known  as  “the  carbon  market" ),  Joint  Implementation  (JI)  and  Clean  Development 
Mechanism (CDM). Emissions trading as set in the Article 17 of the KP, allows for “a trade of 
emissions [AAU] among Annex I Parties or International” (Dagoumas, et al., 2006). Under 
Article 6 of the KP, JI means that any Annex I nation (i.e. industrialized) can potentially 
receive credits for the reduction in GHG emissions achieved by investing in projects located 
in other Annex I nations (Dagoumas, et al., 2006).  According to article 12 of KP, which was 
drafted in 1997 but came into effect in 2005, any Annex I nation can receive credits for the 
reduction in  GHG  emissions  achieved by  investing  in projects  located  in  the developing 
countries.  In  this  paper,  we  are  focusing  on  only  one  Kyoto  market  based-mechanism, 3 
 
emissions trading schemes (ETS). Overall, KP set legally binding emissions targets for 38 
nations. However, KP does not specify the exact mechanism of multi-national or even global 
emissions  trading.  This  issue  has  not  been  clarified  at  the  subsequent  international 
Conferences in Buenos Aires and Bonn (Boom, 2001), Bangkok, Barcelona and Copenhagen.   
 
As compared to KP, where the focus was on the developed nations reducing their emissions, 
the focus of the 2009 United Nations Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen was on 
developing nations reducing their GHG emissions. The objective of this Conference was to 
create  a  new  international  post-Kyoto  legal  architecture  for  addressing  anthropogenic 
climate change (Macintosh, 2010). The outcome of this Conference, so-called Copenhagen 
Accord, set a political non-binding agreement without long-term global goal for emissions 
reduction  (Macintosh,  2010).  Moreover,  no  enforcement  mechanism  in  terms  of 
monitoring,  reporting  or  verifying  emissions  was  developed  under  the  Accord.  The 
subsequent  meeting  in  Cancun  in  2010  was  more  successful  in  achieving  international 
agreements  in  terms  of  adaptation  and  technology  transfer,  reporting  and  verification. 
However, this is also a non-binding treaty which requires rich countries to reduce their GHG 
emissions  (as  pledged  in  Copenhagen  Accord)  and  developing  countries  to  plan  their 
emission reductions to limit global warming to less than 2 degrees above pre-industrial 
level. This was agreed and adopted by 129 nations participated in the conference (Sweet, 
2010).  
 
It seems that in the near future the nations are not likely to create a global emissions 
trading market which could link national and regional systems into one, although at the 
single- country or region level, emissions trading has been in place in some form or another 
for quite some time (Garnaut, 2008; Stern, 2007). For instance, ETS have been operational in 
European  Union,  Switzerland,  Norway,  Australian  New  South  Wales,  several  Chinese 
provinces and Japan. There are plans for the ETS launch in Australia, Canada, United States 
and China. Initially, developed countries were planning to adopt ETS but now developing 
nations are becoming interested in ETS. Another trend in the ETS development, particularly 
in the North America, is formation of the emissions trading through regional blocks rather 
than country-wide coverage. For instance, while the US ETS is still in the preliminary stage, 4 
 
several states have already joined with Canadian provinces to form three regional blocks, 
one of which, Regional GHG Initiative, is fully operational and two more will be launched in 
2012 (Garnaut, 2011).   
 
The main idea of the ETS is to create the market for pollution which will provide economic 
agents with incentives to reduce their emissions at the lowest cost to society (R. N. Stavins, 
et  al.,  2003).  Following  Carmona  et  al.  (2009),  introduction  of  the  ETS  combines  two 
contrasting aspects. Both EU ETS and US Sulphur Dioxide Trading System reduced pollution 
at  minimum  cost  to  society  (Carmona,  et  al.,  2009),  but  at  the  same  time  there  is  an 
increase in the social cost of reducing pollution  because of the transfer of wealth from 
consumers to producers due to large windfall profits. Therefore, the design of ETS plays an 
important role not only in promoting environmental and economic sustainability but also is 
important to the social welfare. There are several designs of ETS including cap-and-trade, 
baseline-and-credit and hybrid. The majority of the existing and proposed emissions trading 
schemes were built via cap-and-trade principle.   
 
The purpose of this paper is to perform a comprehensive review of the existing and the 
proposed  voluntary  and  mandatory  ETS  focusing  on  the  issues  of  design.  This  paper 
contributes  the  literature  by  analysing  a  wide  range  of  ETS  of  developed,  developing 
countries and regional blocks. Findings of this research will be useful for countries with 
existing and proposed ETS and for countries intending to adopt ETS in the future. The paper 
is structured as follows. Section 2 presents types of ETS design and main issues regarding 
design. Section 3 provides a discussion of current and proposed ETS. Section 4 addresses 
practical issues regarding ETS design and implementation and Section 5 concludes the paper.   
 
ETS Design Issues  
2.1 ETS designs  
ETS is a market-based instrument, tradable permits system adopted for pollution control. 
ETS can deliver least-cost emission reductions by allowing reductions to occur wherever 
they are cheapest (Stern, 2007).  Following Marcu and Pizer (2003), ETS are delicate to 
design and implement. If not carefully designed, they can become not simply useless but 5 
 
even  potentially  counter-productive  (Soleille,  2006).  The  design  of  national  ETS  reflects 
domestic  economic  characteristics  and  environmental  policies.  Economic  situation  and 
natural  resource  endowments  as  well  as  the  industrial  structure  and  therefore  current 
emissions structure are important determinants of the ETS design (Tuerk, et al., 2009).    
 
According to Soleille (2006), the following features need to be taken into account when 
designing an ETS: 
-  Transaction costs of operation should be kept as low as possible; 
-  Market for permits should be active so that demand and supply could quickly adjust; 
-  Reliable measurement and monitoring of emissions need to be established; 
-  ETS should have the options of banking of permits. 
 
These schemes are of three basic types: cap-and-trade, baseline-and-credit and hybrid (R. N. 
Stavins, et al., 2003). Cap-and-trade ETS allows the holders of the permits to emit a specified 
volume of GHG. Government issues tradable permits where the sum of all permits equates 
to the total GHG that could be emitted to the atmosphere. The initial distribution of permits 
can be either through auctioning or free allocation to involved parties (Garnaut, 2008; Stern, 
2007). Since the permits are traded, this allows the allocation of permits to where it has the 
greatest economic value. Price of the permit needs to be determined by the market and 
there  will  be  some  volatility  in  the  permit  price.  Internationally  traded  cap-and-trade 
scheme has a greater potential to reduce the cost of abatement by concentrating higher 
levels  of  abatement  in  the  countries  where  abatement  can  be  achieved  at  lowest  cost 
(Garnaut, 2008). 
 
Baseline-and-credit ETS place the responsibility of creating tradable permits with existing 
emitters and not on the government (Garnaut, 2008). This scheme involves an algorithm 
which provides existing emitter with some level of permits (entitlement) to emit. If the 
existing emitter emits below the entitlement, then the surplus can be converted to tradable 
permits. This involves calculation of average emission per unit of production based on a 
given technology, best practice technology and other approaches. However, the choice of 6 
 
algorithm  introduces  arbitrariness  to  the  scheme  and  may  encourage  rent-seeking 
behaviour (Garnaut, 2008) 
 
Hybrid  models  try to  address  the  issues  of  certainty  in  both price  and  quantity.  Hybrid 
scheme will have an establishment of cap-and-trade scheme with an imposed upper limit on 
the price of permits (Garnaut, 2008; McKibbin & Wilcoxen, 2002; Pizer, 2002). Government 
will issue tradable permits up to a cap initially but with a commitment to issue permits at a 
specified ceiling price. This has the certainty about the maximum price while preserving 
some aspects of ETS (Garnaut, 2008). This approach may cause inefficiencies since it would 
not allow firms commitment on levels of emissions, and would limit international and inter-
temporal flexibility in use of permits.  
 
2.2 Conceptual foundations of the ETS Design  
ETS  design  features  include  eligible  gases,  cap,  coverage  (i.e.  sectors)  and  participation 
models, permit allocation, penalty for non-compliance, market access, offsets, banking and 
borrowing, linkage to other schemes, integration to JI and CDM, monitoring, verification and 
reporting (Butzengeiger, et al., 2001).      
 
2.2.1 Gases  
As stated earlier, the KP recognizes six eligible gases including CO2, CH4, N2O, PFC, HFC and 
SF6. Of these GHG, CO2 is the most important, while the contribution of HFCs, PFCs and SF6 
in the global warming is relatively small (Stern, 2007). To foster potential linking with other 
ETS, GHG can be converted in to the CO2-equivalents. In terms of environmental integrity, it 
is advisable to include as many as GHG as possible but it may not be practically feasible 
since each of the gases requires different monitoring system requirements.   
 
2.2.2 Cap  
The methods of determining cap include load-based and source-based cap programmes. A 
source-based program (e.g. EU ETS) regulates the source of emissions and covers only those 
polluting sources which are physically located within the respected regulatory jurisdiction 
(Nelson, 2009). Under a load-based programme (e.g. proposed CO2 cap in the Oregon power 7 
 
sector) imported emissions such as emissions related to electricity lost in transmission from 
generation  sources  located  in  different  regulatory  jurisdictions  also  fall  under  the  load-
based cap (Nelson, 2009).  The advantage of the load-based approach is that it allows taking 
into account potential leakage issues upfront (Nelson, 2009). However, contract shuffling 
can raise concerns in such system.  Caps can also be absolute or relative.  
 
2.2.3 Permit / allowance allocation  
The initial allocation or the total number of allowances issued by the regulator is crucial 
since it is used by a regulator “as a knob to control the emissions level” (Carmona, et al., 
2009).  Weishaar  (2007)  distinguishes  two  types  of  permit  allocation,  market-based  via 
auctioning  and  administrative  allocation  mechanisms.  The  former  include  financial 
administrative allocation mechanisms and free administrative allocation mechanisms (so-
called  grandfathering).  Alternatively,  a  regulator  can  distribute  allowances  through  a 
combination  of  auctioning  and  free  distribution.  While  Stavins  (1997)  advocated  the 
benefits of grandfathering, Cramton and Kerr (1999) suggested that auctions are superior to 
free permit allocation because government can use revenues generated through auctions to 
reduce distortionary taxes. Following Carmona et al. (2009), grandfathering lead to windfall 
profits since companies are pricing their customers at a rate that depends on the emissions 
emitted by the marginal production unit. These profits cannot be avoided if the permits are 
allocated for free.  
 
2.2.4 Coverage 
Following  Butzengeiger,  et.al.  (2001)  to  increase  both  efficiency  and  the  environmental 
effectiveness  of  the  policy,  ETS  coverage  should  include  as  many  relevant  emitters  as 
possible. However, this might not be practical because “the direct inclusion of very small 
emitters also increases transaction costs” (Butzengeiger, et al., 2001). In fact, to achieve a 
liquid market a relatively large number of participants is recommended (Butzengeiger, et al., 
2001). Empirical evidence shows that at the initial stages many ETS are limited to large 
emitters  such  as  electricity  generation.  Participation  is  closely  related  to  monitoring, 
verifying and reporting issues as well as compliance.    
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2.2.5 Penalty for non-compliance 
Following Nelson (2009), the effectiveness of any regulatory regime depends on its ability to 
create  incentives  and  structure  sanctions  to  ensure  compliance.  The  problem  of  non-
compliance can equally apply to the companies and the regulator itself. For instance, if the 
country cannot meet its emissions targets regulator must “comply with the target by buying 
allowances from other countries or generate additional allowances” (Carmona, et al., 2009),  
either through investments in projects under CDM or JI. With respect to companies, the 
type  of penalty  must be  linked  to the  reason of  non-compliance  such  as  over-emitting, 
cheating when calculating or reporting emissions and breaking of contracts (Butzengeiger, 
et al., 2001).   
 
2.2.6 Integration with JI and CDM 
 At the same time, ETS as policy must be interacting with the existing policy instruments 
(Butzengeiger,  et  al.,  2001),  either  domestic  (e.g.  national  energy  efficiency  standards, 
carbon taxes, etc) or international (CDM and JI as defined in the KP). To make sure that ETS 
is  not  creating  a  disproportional burden  on the  participating  organizations,  a  system  of 
policies need to be developed in relation to the non-participating organizations. These two 
types of policies need to be closely linked and over time the coverage of the ETS should 
increase  to  include  non-participating  organizations.  For  example,  Australia  has  very 
ambitious  coverage,  while  EU  ETS  has  been  increasing  its  scope  from  phase  to  phase.    
Presently CDM and JI integration have a lot of uncertainties.  
 
2.2.7 Market access 
The government needs to decide whether access to trading emission allocations needs to be 
restricted to participating organizations. In this case the market for emissions allocations 
will be potentially less liquid as compared to the situation when any willing party including 
financial institutions, non-governmental organizations and private individuals are allowed to 





2.2.8 Offsets  
Under the KP, ‘offsets’ refer to emissions reductions not covered by the cap in an ETS (Spash, 
2009). Following Spash (2009) currently the major source of the KP offsets are the CDM 
projects which generate so-called certified emissions reduction units (CER). If offset projects 
fall under the JI, they create emission reduction unit (ERU). Examples of offset projects 
could  be  investments  in  GHG  emissions  reduction  outside  of  the  polluting  source  and 
creating  sink  capacities  to  absorb  GHG  pollution  (Spash,  2009).  Offset  projects  offer 
economic development opportunities (Nelson, 2009). 
 
2.2.9 Banking and borrowing 
Banking and borrowing of emissions add greater inter-temporal flexibility to the ETS due to 
lowering  the  GHG  abatement  costs,  encourages  private  firms  to  invest  in  emissions 
reductions Based on KP, Z. Zhang (2000) distinguished two types of banking. First, Article 
12.10 of the Protocol allows CERs obtained under the CDM during 2000-2008 to be banked 
for  future  use  by  the  Annex  I  nations.  Second,  Article  3.13  authorises  parties  to  carry 
forward their unused assignment amounts from one commitment period to the next (Z. 
Zhang, 2000).   
 
2.2.10 Linkage with other schemes 
ETS can be linked either directly or indirectly. Direct links allow trade between different 
national schemes and can be unilateral, bilateral or multilateral. The examples of unilateral 
links include the EU Linking Directive which links the EU ETS to the CDM (Tuerk, et al., 2009). 
In a bilateral system, allowances can be traded freely between two ETS and “each system 
allowances are equally valid for compliance in both systems” (Tuerk, et al., 2009). Indirect 
linkage  between  the  ETS  is  possible  through  their  unilateral  links  to  the  third  common 
trading party such as CDM. Following Tuerk at al. (2009), linking allows to create a larger, 
more liquid carbon market.   
 
Tuerk et al. (2009) analysed the issues of barriers to linking based on the analysis of existing 
and emerging ETS in USA, Japan, Australia, New Zealand and the EU. They found that due to 
differences in priorities and objectives in the national ETS, in the short term only very few 10 
 
direct  bilateral  links  will  be  possible  with  indirect  unilateral  links  through  the  CDM  or 
potential post-KP new crediting mechanisms which are yet to be developed.      
 
2.2.11 Monitoring, verification and reporting  
To achieve a reduction in GHG emissions, any ETS should have a strict system of monitoring, 
verification and reporting. The difficulty in implementation could be the need for different 
systems for different GHG. There are several international procedures for monitoring such 
as ISO 14000 series and the European “Eco-Management and Audit Scheme (EMAS). 
 
2.3 Alternatives to ETS  
There  can  be  several  other  policy  instruments  for  reducing  GHG  emissions.  One  other 
market-based  approach  that  is  commonly  discussed  is  carbon  taxes.  Carbon  tax  can  be 
introduced  to  reflect  full  social  cost  of  emissions  (damage  caused  by  emissions)  (Stern, 
2007).  Carbon taxes are simple and governments need not to take discretionary decisions 
about who is allowed to emit (Garnaut, 2008). In addition, taxes are easy to implement with 
the given intuitional structure and will raise revenue which can be used for investing in low-
carbon technologies. High uncertain and volatile carbon prices from ETS may lead to poor 
decisions and this suggest for a fixed carbon tax over ETS (Pizer, 2002).  
 
However, with a carbon tax, meting of emission reduction targets cannot be guaranteed 
though  it  reduces  arbitrariness  of  regulatory  interventions  (Garnaut,  2008).  In  addition, 
carbon tax rate needs variation in order to accommodate increasing emission reductions 
and this requires constant reassessment of the relationship between the tax rate and the 
level of emissions.  
 
There are regulatory responses that can be used to reduce GHG levels. Some regulatory 
options can be to have mandatory restrictions or bans on particular items or mandating, 
licensing or banning particular technologies or production techniques. However, some of 




3. Current and proposed ETS: Country overview  
In this section, we provide country overviews of the existing and proposed ETS. Similar 
analysis has been performed by Milunovich et al. (2007), who compared EU ETS, the NSW 
GHG Abatement Scheme (GGAS) and the Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX) and discussed the 
background economic theory underpinning the abatement policy. As compared to previous 
studies, which performed comparative analysis of the existing ETS, our contribution to the 
literature is the analysis of a broad range of countries with either existing or proposed ETS. 
While studies typically focus on the existing ETS, in this paper we compare both existing and 
proposed schemes. To date the majority of literature has been focusing on the EU ETS 
(Ellerman  &  Buchner,  2007;  Ellerman,  et  al.,  2010).  Typically  studies  focus  either  on 
voluntary or mandatory schemes, but to the best of our knowledge no comparison between 
the two has been done to date. Very few studies have analysed proposed ETS (Butzengeiger, 
et al., 2001; Garnaut, 2008).   
 
Most of the literature on EU ETS has established theoretical foundations behind it, while 
empirical studies on its performance in operational, trading and other aspects as well as the 
comparison between different phases have only recently been published or forthcoming (Y.-
J. Zhang & Wei, 2010) Following Bouttes et al. (2010) one of the major current issues of the 
EU  ETS  is  that  it  did  not  efficiently  provide  enough  incentives  for  investment  in  clean 
technologies. 
 
Following Morotomi (2006), who analysed the outcomes of the Japanese voluntary ETS, in 
general introduction of a voluntary or trial ETS prior to introduction of mandatory ETS has 
several advantages for both businesses and the regulators. First, regulators have the first 
hand  experience  of  managing  collection  of  the  emissions  data,  maintenance  of  the 
electronic registry, legal treatment of the emissions allowances, development of detailed 
rules for the emissions trade. Second, businesses receive informational advantages from 
participating  in  the  scheme.  In  Japan  businesses  can  also  obtain  a  subsidy  from  the 
government to cover one third of their capital investment. Although, voluntary system does 
bring  reduction  in  emissions,  it  is not  cost-effective  because  of  partial  coverage  (Duval, 
2008) and the fact that marginal costs of abatement will differ between emitters (R. Jones & 12 
 
Yoo, 2009). In addition, voluntary system is not likely to provide adequate incentives to 
motivate  emitters  to  innovate  and  find  abatement  options  beyond  their  voluntary 
agreements (R. Jones & Yoo, 2009). According to Duval (2008), voluntary ETS cannot cope 
well with risk and uncertainty since such systems do not provide certainty either about GHG 
emissions  or  abatement  costs  and  cannot  accommodate  changes  as  fast  as  the  price 
instruments. Therefore, voluntary ETS should be used as a trial before introduction of a 
mandatory system. Alternatively, they can be used as domestic complements to national or 
international policy frameworks including more cost-effective policies (Duval, 2008).  
 
In relation to the country experience, it should be noted that although in Japan, Australia 
and Switzerland voluntary agreements (VAs) varied in terms of stringency, monitoring and 
enforcement, covered small amount of industries, were limited to only few eligible gases 
and enjoyed small trading volumes, they did achieve a reduction in emissions. In addition, 
due to limited demand and small participation, voluntary emissions allowances tended to be 
cheaper than permits sold in the mandatory schemes (REFERENCE).  
 
 In this study we classify ETS depending on whether the ETS is mandatory (e.g. EU ETS) or 
voluntary  (e.g.  Japan  and  Switzerland).  In  contrast  to  mandatory  scheme,  where 
organizations have to abide by the rules set by the regulator, under a voluntary scheme, 
organizations may voluntarily choose to participate in ETS. In this case, participants will be 
liable  for their emissions  and the targets  will  represent  legally  binding  agreements that 
companies have to comply to. It is customary for countries to start with the voluntary ETS in 
the pilot stage of its implementation and then transfer to mandatory regime after the trial 
period is over.  
ETS can be further classified as outside or under the Kyoto. Schemes outside the Kyoto tend 
to  be  regional  rather  than  national  and  include  New  South  Wales  GGAS,  Regional 
Greenhouse  Gas  Initiative  and  Western  Climate  Initiative.  All  national  schemes  are 





3.1 Existing (Mandatory) ETS  
3.1.1 EU ETS  
First multi-nation multi-sector ETS in the world was adopted in the European Union in 2005 
(Stern, 2007).  It has been organized in three phases. At the start of Phase I (the 1
st EU ETS 
period) the certificates (EU Allowance
ii) for companies to trade were distributed for free by 
each of the twenty five Member States
iii through the National Allocation Plans (NAP).  Phase 
I  covered  power  industry  (power  p lants,  oil  refineries,  coke  ovens),  heavy  industry 
(production and processing of ferrous metals, cement installations, etc), glass and pulp and 
paper sectors. Since there were more certificates distributed that needed, the price of 
carbon has been steadily declining until the end of this phase (Alberola and Chevallier, 2009). 
Overall, approximately 40 % of the CO 2 emissions in EU were covered by the ETS. Banking 
and  borrowing  of  allowances  were  allowed  only  within  the  Phase  I,  and  no  transfer  of 
allowances into future phases was allowed. Non-compliance penalty for each metric tonne 
of the CO2-equivalent emitted over the allowance was 40 euro.  
 
Phase  II  of  the  EU  ETS  (the  Kyoto  Commitment  Period,  January  2008  -December  2012) 
includes now 27 members of the EU and three non-member nations (Iceland, Liechtenstein 
and Norway). During this phase GHG emissions were capped at 8 percent below 1990 levels. 
In addition to industries covered in Phase I, Phase II extended coverage to include aviation 
(from 2012). Similar to Phase I EU Allowances were distributed via NAPs. Non-compliance 
penalty has been increased to 100 euro per each tonne of CO2-equivalent for emitting above 
the target. Linkage of EU ETS with other schemes is possible though bilateral agreements.   
Banking of allowance in the second phase is unlimited, while borrowing is restricted to the 
current, not future period. 
   
Phase  III,  starting  from  January  2013  will  last  until  December  2020.  During  this  phase 
allocation of permits will be centralized and up to 60% of certificates will be auctioned. As 
compared to previous phases, only 5% and 10% of allowances were allowed to be auctioned 
by  each  Member  State.  From  2013  petrochemicals,  aluminum,  maritime  transport  and 
forestry will be included in the scheme.  
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Prior to the inclusion of Norway into the EU ETS, it already had the CO2 tax in 1991, which 
covered mineral oil refineries and petroleum exploration and production in the North Sea. 
When  ETS  started  in  Norway  in  2005,  the  scheme  covered  only  10%  of  emissions 
predominantly  from  the  industrial  use  including  cement  and  lime  production, 
petrochemicals, ceramics, pulp and paper as well as the energy sector including mineral oil 
refineries and offshore oil and gas production. In 2008 after completion Phase 1, Norwegian 
ETS was linked to the EU ETS. Following the Norwegian National Allocation Plan (NAP, 2008), 
Phase II covers 35–40% of the GHG emissions (15 Mt per year). Out of this 50% of the 
allowances are sold at the prevailing market conditions, while the rest are either distributed 
for free (approximately 39%) or put in the reserve for the new power plants built under the 
carbon capture and storage technology. After 2012 all allowances will be auctioned. 
 
Similar to Norway, UK joined EU ETS after establishing its own scheme in 2002, which was 
voluntary in nature. The thirty-two so-called “Direct Participants” and approximately 1,500 
other trading parties participated in the Scheme. The participants differed in size, industry 
(i.e. energy-intensive and service industries), sector (both private and public sector) and 
included  such  organizations  as  Shell,  British  Airways,  UK  Coal  and  others.  The  annual 
emission  reduction  targets  for  each  Direct  Participant  were  developed  based  on  its 
“baseline’  emissions  between  1998  and  2000”  (DEFRA,  2006).  Although  every  year  the 
target was increasing, over the life of the scheme each direct participant committed to a 
13% reduction in emissions (DEFRA, 2006).  Smaller trading parties mostly participated in 
the trading. In April 2002 when the ETS commenced, 96% of the allowances were awarded 
to the Direct Participants and the remainder to smaller parties. Over the life of the scheme, 
a  reduction  in  GHG  emissions  equal  to  7.2  million  tonnes  of  CO2 equivalent  has  been 
achieved (DEFRA, 2006).  In 2006 UK ETS was terminated and UK joined the EU ETS.  
 
Overall, EU ETS is generally portrayed in the literature as an example of successful design. In 
particular ETS has very high standard of monitoring and reporting as well as compliance 
measures. All necessary modern infrastructure for the success full operation of the system 
has been established in the first phase. However, there are several design flaws which have 
reduced the effectiveness of the EU ETS. Following Jones et al. (2007) if in the initial stage 15 
 
the total allocation has turned out to exceed actual emissions, in the second phase market 
scarcity is expected “reflecting informational difficulties.”  Second problem relates to the 
over-provision of free allocations, which has been solved in the second phase.   
 
3.1.2 New South Wales (Australia) 
The  GGAS,  one  of  the  first  regional  mandatory  ETS  in  the  world,  is  the  first  Australian 
mandatory emissions trading scheme, which covers GHG emissions from production and the 
use of electricity and two states (the New South Wales (operational since 2003) and the 
Australian Capital Territory (operational since 2005)).  The Scheme strives to achieve a 5% 
reduction below the KP baseline of 1990 (GGAS, 2008). It is designed as baseline-and-credit 
and it will be in place either until 2021 or until the nation-wide ETC becomes operational. 
GGAS establishes annual GHG benchmark and requires individual participants (those who 
buy  or  sell  electricity  in  the  NSW)  to  meet  their  allocation  by  surrendering  abatement 
certificates created from project-based emission reduction activities (GGAS, 2008). These 
certificates are produced by the Abatement Certificate Providers (ACP). Each certificate is 
equal to a tonne of emissions and can further be traded between the market participants.  
In the event of non-compliance with the mandatory benchmark, participants are liable for 
AU$ 15 penalty per tonne of CO2-equivalent, which will be adjusted on the annually based 
on the CPI. The scheme covers all GHG which are associated with the production and use of 
electricity.  Main regulator of the Scheme is Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal of 
New South Wales (IPART), which acts as the Scheme Administrator and the Compliance 
Operator. 
 
3.2 Proposed (Mandatory) ETS 
3.2.1 New Zealand  
New Zealand is aiming at 10 to 20 percent reduction relative to 1990, conditional on a 
comprehensive global agreement to limit the temperature increase to less than 2 degrees 
(Garnaut, 2011). New Zealand ETS is the system that enables the trading of New Zealand 
Units (NZU). NZU gives the right to emit one tonne of carbon dioxide or equivalent. ETS in 
New Zealand will be reviewed and assessed in 2011 to identify about the other trading 
partners action on climate change. The key areas for the review would be how to change 16 
 
the scheme's design to match any possible new global deal to fight climate change, whether 
to ramp up the scheme and to include new sectors. New Zealand government is considering 
including all sectors of the economy and all GHG by 2015 (New Zealand Government, 2011). 
The scheme covers about half the country's GHG emissions during its first phase and runs 
until the start of 2013. A transition period between 1 July 2010 and 31 December 2012 will 
be introduced and during this period participants will be able to buy emission units from 
government for a fixed price of $25. In addition, participants in the energy, industrial and 
liquid fossil fuel sectors will have to surrender only one emission unit for every two tonnes 
of emissions they produce. After the transition period one emission unit will be equal to one 
tonne of emissions.  
 
New  Zealand  ETS  will  cover  forestry,  transport  fuels,  electricity  production,  industrial 
processes,  synthetic  gasses,  agriculture  and  waste.  Sectors  will  introduce  to  the  ETS 
gradually over a period of seven years. Transport, electricity, industrial processes and waste 
sectors  may  start  reporting  their  emission  levels  voluntarily  two  years  before  their 
mandatory obligation. Agriculture sector has four years of voluntary reporting before the 
mandatory reporting. Agriculture, which is responsible for half the country's GHG emissions, 
mainly  methane  from  livestock,  is  excluded  until  2015.  New  Zealand  ETS  can  be 
internationally linked and will reflect international climate change rules. This ETS will use 
self-assessment for monitoring, reporting and verifying emissions produced by participants. 
In addition, an electronic register will record on who holds emission units and called the 
New Zealand Emission Unit Register (NZEUR) (New Zealand Government, 2011). 
 
Government will provide financial assistance for some sectors in the form of free emission 
units. New Zealand's scheme allocates up to 90 percent of pollution permits for free to 
energy-intensive firms that export their goods to nations without carbon caps. Each permit 
represents a tonne of carbon emissions. Power generators and transport firms receive no 
free  permits.  New  Zealand  will  provide  opportunity  for  its  ETS  to  be  linked  with  the 
international  schemes.  With  international  linking,  the  activities  of  large  New  Zealand 
participants will have little or no impact on world prices. If the scheme were limited to New 17 
 
Zealand units, one large player buying or selling their units would have a material impact on 
prices. 
 
New Zealand ETS has penalty schemes in place if participants fail to collect emissions data or 
other  required  information,  calculate  their  emissions  and/or  removals,  keep  records, 
register  as  a  participant  when  you  are  supposed  to,  submit  an  emissions  return  when 
required, or notify the administering agency or provide information when they are required 
to do so. In addition, participants will be fined if they knowingly alter, falsify or provide 
incomplete or misleading information about any of their obligations under the emissions 
trading scheme (New Zealand Government, 2011). 
 
3.2.2 Japan  
Japan’s voluntary ETS was designed as baseline-and-credit system, in which participating 
companies were eligible for government subsidies as assistance in reducing GHG emissions. 
These  subsidies  had  to  be  returned  to  the  government  if  companies  failed  to  achieve 
emissions reduction. Overall the scheme achieved a modest reduction in emissions.   
 
Japan is maintaining strong commitment to action on climate change following Copenhagen 
accord and Cancun. They have set their reduction targets of 25 percent below 1990 levels by 
2020 (Garnaut, 2011). But this commitment is premised on fair and effective international 
framework in which all economies participate and agree on ambitious targets. Japan also 
has a longer-term target to cut carbon dioxide from fossil fuels by 30 percent from 1990 
levels  by  2030.  This  proposes  a  mandatory  ETS  (cap-and-trade),  a  global  warming  tax 
together with a range of measures to promote renewable energy and additional measures 
to promote energy efficiency. The proposal broadly outlines a scheme which would see 
emissions caps implemented on large emitters in two phases, from 2013 and 2016.  
 
The Japanese scheme would initially cover only carbon dioxide, which currently accounts for 
about 95 percent of Japan’s GHG emissions. Japan's emissions reduction target would be 
virtually  impossible  to  meet  without  deeper  emission  cuts  by  manufacturers,  power 
generators and offices and commercial operations. It confirms that companies forced to 18 
 
comply with carbon caps under the new rules and will be able to buy carbon offsets from 
abroad to help them meet their target. It also signals that some concessions will be made to 
carbon-intensive  industries  that  face  stiff  international  competition  and  to  low-carbon 
sectors, such as solar panel manufacturing, that help to curb greenhouse gas emissions.  
 
Japan  has  been  holding  bilateral  talks  with  developing  nations  to  transfer  clean-energy 
technologies and receive emissions offsets to meet its 2020 goal. Japan signed a bilateral 
agreement  with  China  over  the  weekend  that  will  see  the  two  neighbors  work  closer 
together on climate change and energy-efficiency projects. However, questions of emissions 
permit allocation, international linkages to international schemes and how to cover power 
sector emissions are left open at this stage. 
 
However, there is significant uncertainty surrounding the establishment of a mandatory ETS 
due  to  political  uncertainty.  Japan  is  increasingly  facing  challenges  with  their  national 
emissions  trading  scheme,  since powerful business  groups have  warned  of  job  losses  as 
they compete against overseas rivals facing fewer emissions regulations. Japanese officials 
and politicians no longer believe that forcing companies to accept allocated emission caps, 
as in Europe, would work in Japan. Japan is now trying to reconsider of having an ETS than a 
Carbon tax.   
 
3.2.3 South Korea  
South Korea, the world's fifth-largest importer of oil and one of the world's fastest-growing 
carbon  polluters,  has been  trying to  shift  away  from  its  reliance on fossil  fuels,  sharply 
increasing investment in green resources. South Korea's emissions doubled between 1990 
and 2007 and the nation is heavily reliant on fossil fuel imports to power its economy. The 
Ministry  of  Environment  said  in  a  statement  the  Korea  Exchange  (KRX)  will  serve  as  a 
platform for carbon emissions trading, also known as cap-and-trade. Under the program, 
participating organizations will be issued emission permits, a right to emit a certain amount 
that should not exceed the limit set by the government, and can trade remaining allowances 
or buy them from those who emit less. South Korea plans to reduce emissions to 30 percent 
below business-as-usual levels by 2020 (Garnaut, 2011). The government plans to allocate 19 
 
more than 90 percent of carbon trade rights with no charge during the first phase between 
2013 and 2015. Trading is likely to start from 2013 and is part of a two-step plan by the 
government  to mandate  emissions  cuts  by  big  polluters. The  South  Korean  government 
recently introduced a scheme which requires 374 local companies to set GHG reduction 
targets by September 2011. 
 
About 470 firms or operations emitting more than 25,000 tonnes of carbon dioxide per year 
will have to participate. In total, these represent 60 percent of South Korea's total GHG 
emissions of just over 600 million tonnes a year. All sectors, from ship-building to refiners, 
electronics  to  power  firms,  will  be  covered,  even  buildings  such  as  universities,  waste 
disposal sites and big amusement parks. Trading begins in 2013 and from 2016 the two 
subsequent phases run for five years each. The government will impose regulations to force 
major emitters to comply as part of the nation's efforts against climate change. The biggest 
emitters, which produced more than 125,000 tonnes of CO2 in the past three years, will be 
given a grace period before they are subject to mandatory cuts. No detailed incentives or 
penalties for the cuts have been decided. 
 
The actual trading plan will be managed by Korea Power Exchange, Korea Exchange or a new 
commodities  exchange  to  trade  emissions.  The  committee  is  also  thinking  of  trading 
certified  emission reductions.  These  are  tradeable  offsets  or  credits that are  created  to 
promote and reward investors of clean-energy projects.  Linking the trading scheme with 
bigger markets such as China in future is also being considered. 
 
3.2.4 Russia  
Russia has ratified KP in 2005 and during 2008-2012 pledged not to allow an increase in the 
GHG above 1990 levels. Even without additional measures, the compliance is not likely to be 
a problem because at present the average level of emissions is 30% below 1990.  Russia has 
pledged to above conditional on appropriate accounting of the potential of Russia’s forestry 
and legally binding obligations by all emitters  (Garnaut, 2011). In fact, before Kyoto expiry 
in 2012, Russia has more than 5 billion sovereign emissions rights (AAUs) to sell (Sergeyev & 20 
 
Szabo, 2010), meaning that at present it is one of the largest producers of the AAU in 
Europe.  
 
Over the period 2006-2009 Russia introduced several legislations including a plan of social 
and  economic  development  2020,  legislative  measures  targeting  energy  efficiency 
improvements, proposals for a national Climate Change doctrine and a Decree 884-r, which 
stipulates  the  creation  of  the  ETS  in  Russia  under  Article  17  of  the  KP.  In  this  Decree 
government  commissioned largest  state-owned  credit  institution  in  Russia,  Sberbank,  to 
participate in pilot projects which involve emissions trading of all six GHG under Kyoto.  In 
2010 Sberbank hosted 2 carbon-credit tenders for projects that plan to cut greenhouse 
gases under the United Nations’ Joint Implementation program with bids as much as 30 
million tones of CO2 equivalent (Ustinova, 2010). 
 
3.2.5 China  
Following  Chang  and  Wang  (2010),  Chinese  government  at  different  levels  expressed 
interest in reducing emissions in late 1990s. In 2001, the State Environmental Protection 
Agency (SEPA) launched  so-called 4+3+1 program which initiated pilot emissions trading in  
four provinces (Shandong, Jiangsu, Shanxi, and Henan), three cities (Shanghai, Tianjin, and 
Liuzhou), and one company (China Huaneng Group) in the power sector  (B. Zhang, et al., 
2010). The system mostly targeted SO2 emissions and was designed as cap-and-trade. China 
has pledged to cut its carbon emissions per unit of economic growth by 40 to 45 percent by 
2020 from 2005 levels. 
 
 Although, limited trading still occurs in these pilot areas, overall these pilot ETS have failed 
due to conflicts in different environmental policies and strong administrative interference (B. 
Zhang,  et  al.,  2010).  Recently,  the  Chinese  government  announced  that  all-China  pilot 
emissions  trading  system  will  be  implemented  in  the  12th  Five-Year  Plan  (2011-2015).  
Although this program is still under development, legal system for reduction emissions in 
power industry is already in place as well as the emissions trading platforms. At present in 
China there are eight environmental exchanges.
iv The first, Tianjin Climate Exchange, was 
established in Tianjin Binhai Area in 2008 and is designed as domestic cap-and-trade trading 21 
 
platform system. The second, China Beijing Environmental Exchange (CBEEX), was designed 
as domestic and international platform. The most recent exchange was opened in June 2010 
in Dalian, Liaoning province.  
 
3.2.6 India  
The Government of India has made a commitment not to allow country’s per capita GHG 
emissions to rise above per capita emissions of Advanced countries (Joshi & Patel, 2009).   
India will soon start a market-based emission trading system to check industrial pollution 
that will allow auctioning of pollution permits to industries under an ETS for air pollution. 
The  proposed  system  involves  regulator  setting  a  pollution  cap,  aggregate  as  also  for 
individual units, and let industries trade permits by ensuring low pollution self-regulation. To 
begin  with, the  system will  be  implemented  in  Gujarat  and  Tamil Nadu  as  these  states 
contain critically polluted areas with many large industries. It will be implemented under a 
cap on air pollutants set by the respective state pollution control boards as a pilot for the 
rest of the country for six months. Auctioning of the permits will also yield revenue for 
implementing regulations, besides ensuring that firms responsible for emissions bear the 
full cost of their emissions. Introduction of emissions trading would position India as a clear 
leader in environmental regulation among emerging economies (Christopher, 2010).  
 
3.2.7 Australia  
Australia has proposed to have an ETS called Carbon Pollution Reduction Schemes (CPRS) 
and  will  use  a  cap-and-trade  mechanism.  However,  the  extreme  weather  related 
catastrophic conditions have given rise to the discussions on Carbon taxes and to delay the 
introduction of the CPRS. Australia may commence its Carbon taxes in July 2012 which may 
be followed by the CPRS in 3 to 5 years time. 
 
The  initially  proposed  CPRS  will  cover  75  percent  of  Australia’s  total  emissions  directly 
affecting about 1000 entities. CPRS will have a commitment to reduce carbon pollution by 
25 percent  of  2000  levels  by  2020  if Australia  is  a party to  an  international  agreement 
capable of stabilizing GHG at 450 parts per million Carbon dioxide equivalence (Garnaut, 
2011). Emissions from the stationary energy, transport sector, fugitive energy, waste water 22 
 
and waste incineration and synthetic GHG are included in the CPRS. CPRS will not include 
emissions  from  waste  landfill  and  combustion  of  biofuels  and  biomass  energy  and 
deforestation.  Landfill  facilities  with  emissions  of  25,000  tonnes  of  carbon  dioxide 
equivalence or more in a financial year will be covered by the CPRS. Australian government 
has excluded agriculture energy from the CPRS which accounts to about 16 percent of the 
national emissions (Australian Government, 2011).  
 
The price for Australian emissions units will depend on a number of factors, including the 
scheme cap, scheme coverage, international linking, and the costs of emission reduction 
opportunities. The CPRS has been designed to be able to link with international carbon 
markets. Unlimited banking and limited borrowing of permits will help lower overall CPRS 
costs (by providing flexibility over when abatement can occur) and will help promote a 
smoother carbon price path. The entities will report under the National Greenhouse and 
Energy  reporting  System  (NGERS),  which  provides  a  national  framework  for  reporting 
greenhouse and energy data. The report will need to include direct emissions for which an 
entity is liable, the details of those emissions and certain data used to measure emissions. If 
a liable entity does not surrender sufficient units, then it will have an administrative penalty. 
The administrative penalty is calculated by multiplying the unit shortfall with the penalty per 
unit, which will be 110% of the average auction price or a lower amount if prescribed in 
regulations (Australian Government, 2011). 
 
3.3 Regional blocks: US and Canada  
23 states of the USA and Canadian provinces have established three regional ETS, all of 
which are designed as the cap-and-trade systems. Canada has pledged have a 17 percent 
reduction  relative  to  2005  and  they  are  expecting  the  targets  to  be  aligned  with  final 
economy-wide  emission  targets  of  the  US  (Garnaut,  2011).  The  Regional  GHG  Initiative 
(RGGI) is the first mandatory program to reduce GHG emissions in North America.
v This 
scheme introduced a regional cap on the CO 2 emissions that fossil – fuelled power stations 
can emit. During the first period of operation (2009-2014), the cap is set at 188 million short 
tons of CO2 per year and applies only to electricity generating facilities of producing 25 
megawatts  and  above.  In  the  second  phase  of  operation  from  2015,  the  cap  will  be 23 
 
decreased by 2.5 percent every year with the goal to achieve 10 percent reduction in CO2 
emissions by 2018.  At present the scheme covers 209 fossil fuel-fired power plants. Planned 
review of the RGGI is expected in 2012. As compared to the EU ETS design features, under 
RGGI there are no restrictions on banking, which reduces volatility on the market.  If in the 
EU ETS compliance period is one year, RGGI design allows multi-year compliance period 
(three years). Similar to EU ETS, RGGI is a source-based program.     
 
In contrast to RGGI, the Western Climate Initiative (WCI) covers approximately 90 percent of 
economy-wide emissions in the Partner jurisdictions. WCI is set to achieve reduction of the 
regional  GHG  to  15%  below  the  2005  levels  by  the  year  2020  based  on  the  individual 
member’s  emission  reduction  goals.  Only  forestry  and  agriculture  are  not  covered  by 
program.  
 
Similar to WCI, Midwestern GHG Reduction Accord (MGGRA) is multi-sector cap-and-trade 
mechanism.  The  MGGRA  will  cover  energy  (electricity  generation  and  imports, 
Transportation  fuels  and  fuels  serving  residential,  commercial  and  industrial  buildings) 
sector and also extend to industrial combustion and process sources (MGGRA, 2009) as long 
as the sector has annual emissions equal to or greater than 20,000 metric tonnes of CO2-
equivalent. The goal of MGGRA is achieving a 20% reduction in the emissions as compared 
to 2005 level by 2020 and 80% reduction below 2005 levels by 2050.  As compared to the EU 
ETS,  where  Phase  1  started  without  emissions  reporting  prior  to  the  launch,  MGGRA 
requires participating organizations to report their emissions of six GHG two years before 
the  introduction  of  the  scheme  in  order  to  set  the  accurate  amount  of  allocations  to 
distribute. This allows avoiding over-allocation of permits, which happened in the EU once it 
was launched.   
 
3.3 Voluntary ETS 
3.3.1 Japan  
At present Japan is the world's fifth-biggest emitter of GHG. Japan launched its Voluntary 
domestic emission trading scheme (JVETS) in May 2005. The government of Japan provides 
the  economic  incentives  for  corporations  that try  to  achieve  emission  reduction targets 24 
 
determined by them and implements a voluntary participation in domestic emission trading 
utilizing  trade  of  emission  quotas  (cap-and-trade).  One  third  of  cost  of  GHG  reductions 
activities  will  be  subsidized  by  the  government,  however,  if  industries  fail  to  reach  the 
targets, subsidy should be returned to the government. In this scheme the participants are 
allowed to transfer the excess emission allowances to the next term.  Japanese government 
expected JVETS could be good basis for a future cap-and-trade scheme. In the first round 
they had around 31 firms and the second phase around 61. The first phase (2005-2007) of 
the JVETS ended in the summer 2007 and the second phase is from 2006 to 2008. First 
phase achieved 29% reduction of the base year emissions (base year is the emission average 
from 2002 to 2004) and second phase achieved 25% reduction of the base year emissions. 
 
One  of  the  big  contributions  of  JVETS  is  that  has  established  basic  infrastructure  (the 
emission monitoring, reporting and verification guidelines, registry system, and emissions 
management system etc.) which is required for smooth operation. JVETS has third party 
emission verifiers to conduct emission verification to ensure the credibility. Monitoring and 
reporting guidelines are similar to EU ETS guidelines and these ensure appropriate reporting 
and  monitoring  by  the  participants.  JVETS  are  aiming  to  improve  target  setting  and 
verification  method,  expand  the  number  of  participants  and  improve  the  transaction 
systems for smoother operations.  
 
3.3.2 Switzerland 
In  January  2008  the  Swedish  government  introduced  the  voluntary  Swiss  ETS  and  the 
mandatory  CO2  tax.  To  be  exempt  from  the  tax,  companies  need  to  enter  voluntary 
agreements to reduce CO2. Based on these targets for 2008-2012, emission allowances were 
distributed to participating companies free of charge.  In the event of excess emissions, 
allowances  had  to  be  purchased  either  domestically  or  on  the  international  market. 
Industries covered by the ETS include energy intensive industries such as cement, ceramics, 
paper and pulp, and glass production. In the event of non-compliance with the ETS, violating 
company will have to pay   penalty. In future, the government is planning to link the scheme 
with EU ETS.  
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4. Discussion  
This section compares the existing and proposed ETS focussing on design features. EU ETS 
can consider as a successful ETS design since EU is learning from their past mistakes in Phase 
I and II. The current analysis shows that not all proposed ETS include all 6 Kyoto gases, but 
focus on CO2 reductions, meaning that majority of anthropogenic emissions is covered, but 
not all. EU ETS Phase I, RGGI, Switzerland ETS cover only CO2. Most observed caps are either 
based on 1990 (Kyoto baseline) or 2000 emission levels. Australia New South Wales, EU, 
New Zealand, Japan and South Korea chose caps based on 1990 emission levels whereas 
Australian CPRS is based on 2000. US and Canada regional blocks have designed their caps 
based on 2005 emission levels. Nations seems to be in agreement with choosing one tonne 
of CO2-equivalent as a face value of a permit. 
 
If in the past ETS chose allocating permits for free, current evidence shows that majority of 
proposed ETS will allocate permits initially through a combination of grandfathering and 
auctioning. Grandfathering is typically thought as assistance to the affected industries. In 
the initial stages, banking and borrowing are limited to the compliance period. For example, 
EU ETS did not allow transfer of permits from phase I to future phases. It is typical for all 
mandatory  ETS  to  place  a  penalty  for  non-compliance,  such  as  over-emitting,  cheating, 
under or non-reporting and breach of contracts.  The non-compliance penalty is calculated 
based on the tonnes of CO2-equivalent and is typically adjusted for inflation.  
 
Monitoring costs are very high, typically governments tend to outsource monitoring and 
verification to the private sector.  Every scheme provides assistance measures to carbon 
intensive industries which may be exposed to international trade. Such measures include 
subsidies (Japan) and free permits (Australia, New Zealand). It is customary for the ETS to 
have free market access meaning that all interested parties can participate in carbon trading 
(spot market and the derivatives). The market for Carbon derivatives is growing very fast 
and at present there are many environmental exchanges such as, Chicago Climate Exchange, 
Nordic Nord Pool and Tianjin Climate Exchange.  
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Schemes do vary in terms of the industries covered, but almost every country targets to 
include carbon-intensive industries such as energy, in particular electricity generation from 
fossil fuels, and heavy industries. It is also common for nations to exclude agriculture at 
least in the first few years of the ETS operation. It is customary for ETS to have provisions for 
offsets which can be either under KP or not. For example, the offsets under New South 
Wales (Australia) ETS are not under the KP. However, most countries have not explicitly 
stated about the provisions for offsets.  
  
Final goal of every country’s ETS is to link with the global carbon market. Therefore, every 
scheme has some provisions for linking its ETS with other regional or global schemes. For 
example, Swiss ETS is linked with the EU ETS. However, these provisions may have not 
specifically addressed the problems that will be faced in practice. It is ideal for countries to 
link their ETS with JI and CDM. But in practice only EU ETS has such integrations. Even 
though some of the other ETS has provisions to link ETS with JI and CDM, the amount of 
such integrations are very small.   
 
5. Policy Implications and Conclusion 
In this paper we have compared existing and proposed mandatory and voluntary ETS. We 
have found that in order to achieve a reduction in the GHG emissions, an ETS must give 
sufficient incentives to economic agents to reduce their emissions. ETS must give sufficient 
incentives to economic agents to reduce their emissions. At the initial stages the ETS need 
not to be over ambitious in terms of the amount of sectors covered and the desire reduction 
levels.  It  is  recommended  to  have  a  trial  voluntary  ETS  prior  to  the  introduction  of 
mandatory schemes. First, this will provide necessary experience for both the regulators and 
market participants. Second, it will assist in formulation of the mandatory cap. Third, it will 
provide sufficient time to have necessary infrastructure and institutional readiness for an 
efficient mandatory scheme.  
 
Allocation of permits should be based on collecting emissions data from all eligible GHG for 
at least several years prior to the implementation of the ETS. This data will be used as a 
baseline reference case based on which the cap and amount of allowances to be issued will 27 
 
be determined. Otherwise, national ETS will have the problem of either under or over-
allocation the allowances similar to what happened in EU. Problem of the EU ETS in the first 
phase was over-allocation of permits. All EU members gave up allowances for free apart 
from Denmark, which auctioned 5% of the allowances. Ellerman and Buchner (2007) report 
that  in  2005,  allowances  exceeded  emissions  by  approximately  80  million  tons  of  CO2-
equivalent  or  4%  of  the  EU’s  maximum  level.  This  over-allocation  of  permits  lead  to 
decrease not only in the price of permits, but also in prices of goods and services in the 
economy.   
 
Weishaar (2007) examined differences of free and auction allowance allocation mechanisms 
with regard to allocative efficiency. He found that in the open dynamic economy, both initial 
allocation  allowances  give  similar  outcome  but  auctions  and  financial  administrative 
allocation mechanisms perform worse than the free allocation.  However, a mixture of free 
allocation and auctioning would be the preferred method of initial allocation. For example, 
free allocation of permits can be used as form of assistance to the affected industries. The 
revenue from auctioning could be used to invest in low-carbon technologies and also used 
in CDM and JI. However, the proportion of free allocation and auctioning will vary due to 
different factors and decision should be left at the country’s discretion.  
 
Following Tuerk et al. (2009) to implement bilateral or multilateral linking good coordination 
between the nations is required which can be achieved through binding agreements. Such 
agreements contribute to the stability of the carbon market overall since withdrawal and 
termination conditions are clearly specified (Mehling & Haites, 2009). To date, no binding 
bilateral or multilateral agreements are present.  
 
For an ETS to be successful, monitoring, verification and reporting have to be of a very high 
standard which assigns higher costs. Different gases, industries require varying standards, 
however,  with  time  technological  advancement  and  learning  by  doing  will  bring  a 
substantial reduction in these costs. Penalties for non-compliance should be of progressive 
structure so that it will provide the incentives to become more efficient and effective. The 
appropriate enforcement structure for penalties should be in place.  28 
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